Promo Umroh Murah di Aceh Hubungi 021-9929-2337 atau 0821-2406-5740 Alhijaz Indowisata adalah perusahaan swasta nasional yang bergerak di bidang tour dan travel. Nama Alhijaz terinspirasi dari istilah dua kota suci bagi umat islam pada zaman nabi Muhammad saw. yaitu Makkah dan Madinah. Dua kota yang penuh berkah sehingga diharapkan menular dalam kinerja perusahaan. Sedangkan Indowisata merupakan akronim dari kata indo yang berarti negara Indonesia dan wisata yang menjadi fokus usaha bisnis kami.

Promo Umroh Murah di Aceh Alhijaz Indowisata didirikan oleh Bapak H. Abdullah Djakfar Muksen pada tahun 2010. Merangkak dari kecil namun pasti, alhijaz berkembang pesat dari mulai penjualan tiket maskapai penerbangan domestik dan luar negeri, tour domestik hingga mengembangkan ke layanan jasa umrah dan haji khusus. Tak hanya itu, pada tahun 2011 Alhijaz kembali membuka divisi baru yaitu provider visa umrah yang bekerja sama dengan muassasah arab saudi. Sebagai komitmen legalitas perusahaan dalam melayani pelanggan dan jamaah secara aman dan profesional, saat ini perusahaan telah mengantongi izin resmi dari pemerintah melalui kementrian pariwisata, lalu izin haji khusus dan umrah dari kementrian agama. Selain itu perusahaan juga tergabung dalam komunitas organisasi travel nasional seperti Asita, komunitas penyelenggara umrah dan haji khusus yaitu HIMPUH dan organisasi internasional yaitu IATA. Promo Umroh Murah di Aceh

Sedikit latar belakang bagaimana besi beton dibuat

Besi beton diproduksi secara umum terdiri dari 3 jenis: besi beton permukaan polos (round bar), besi beton ulir (deformed bar) dan besi beton kanal u (shape). Bahan baku besi beton adalah billet, yang juga merupakan balok baja berukuran 100 x 100 mm, 110 x 110 mm, 120 x 120mm dengan panjang masing-masing sekitar 170 mm. Bahan baku dari billet sendiri adalah besi-besi tua, skrap, serta bahan penolong seperti kokas, grafit, lime, ferro alloys yang dilebur dengan berbagai metode. Bahan penolong tadi digunakan untuk mendapatkan unsur carbon (C), Si (silicon), Mn (Mangan) yang akan sangat berpengaruh pada qualitas besi beton.
 
Mutu besi beton yang baik adalah yang telah memiliki kekuatan tarik (standard yield strength / Ys) minimal 24 kg / mm2. Kadar carbon berpengaruh besar kepada sifat mekanik dari besi beton. Kadar carbon yang terlalu besar akan membuat besi beton menjadi lebih getas dan akan meningkatkan kekerasan dan kekuatan tarik tetapi keuletannya cenderung menurun. Kadar unsur silikon berpengaruh terhadap struktur mikro besi beton. Kadar silikon yang rendah mengakibatkan besi menjadi kropos. Kadar unsur mangan berpengaruh besar pada keuletan besi beton. Unsur mangan yang terlalu banyak dapat meningkatkan keuletan tetapi mengurangi kekerasan.

Cara menghitung berat besi beton SNI (Standard Nasional Indonesia)
 
Polos dengan grade U24 (Standard Yield Strength: 24 kg / mm2)

Ulir dengan grade U40 (Standard Yield Strength: 40 kg / mm2)

Berat (dalam kg) = diameter (mm) * diameter (mm) * panjang (m) * 0.006165

0.006165 merupakan coefisien dalam mencari berat besi beton.

Sebagai contoh besi dengan diameter 10mm dan panjang 12m mempunyai berat

10*10*12*0.006165 = 7.398 kg

Untuk daerah bali dan sekitarnya, besi yang banyak dipasarkan adalah besi dari PT Hanil Jaya Steel - Surabaya. Hal ini dikarenakan biaya transportasi yang lebih murah dan kualitas besi beton yang baik. Besi beton SNI dari pabrik Hanil mempunyai toleransi 0.2mm dengan panjang 12m. Besi beton jenis ini mempunyai marking seperti "HIJ SNI 16mm" untuk ukuran 16mm.

Besi Beton Ulir/Sirip SNI 13mm

Besi Beton Polos SNI 10mm

Contoh diatas adalah besi beton ulir SNI 13mm (S13 = Sirip 13) dan besi beton polos SNI 10mm (P10 = Polos 10)

Selain besi beton jenis SNI, terdapat juga besi beton NON-SNI atau sering kali disebut BANCI. Kekuatan tarikan atau yield strength dari besi beton jenis ini tidak dapat dipastikan. Untuk besi beton dengan marking HJ menurut informasi dari pabrik mempunyai kekuatan U19-20 untuk yang jenis polos dan untuk jenis ulir mempunya kekuatan U25-30. Toleransi untuk besi beton jenis ini biasanya lebih besar sampai 0.3mm dengan panjang 12m dan terdapat marking dengan berbagai tanda salah satunya HJ.

Besi Beton NON SNI Ulir/Sirip 13mm

Besi Beton NON SNI Ulir/Sirip 13mm (Ukuran Sket 12.5mm)
 
Terdapat lagi jenis besi beton tarikan. Besi beton jenis ini biasanya tidak mempunyai panjang 12m dan tidak terdapat marking atau tanda.
 
Perhatian!

Terdapat fenomena belakangan ini banyak penjual menjual kawat baja dan bukan besi beton. Besi beton dengan diameter ukuran 6-10mm yang sering kali menjadi korban. Fungsi dari kawat baja sangat berbeda dengan besi beton. Kawat baja berfungsi untuk pengikat dan besi beton berfungsi untuk penyangga. Sehingga kekuatan tarikan kawat baja jauh dibawah kekuatan besi beton. Hanya saja diameter kawat baja ini sama besar dengan besi beton ukuran tertentu. Hal ini sering kali digunakan untuk mendapatkan pasar atau pun mengeruk keuntungan maximal.
 
Anda dapat mempercayakan supplier besi anda kepada kami. Kami hanya menjual besi dari PT Hanil Jaya Steel - Surabaya dengan marking HIJ untuk besi beton SNI dan marking HJ untuk besi beton NON-SNI.

 

BELAKANG BAGAIMANA BESI BETON DIBUAT

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

Photo
 
Michael J. Morell Credit Mark Wilson/Getty Images

“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

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“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”

Ex-C.I.A. Official Rebuts Republican Claims on Benghazi Attack in ‘The Great War of Our Time’

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