Harga Haji Umroh Bersama Mamah Dedeh di Jakarta Utara Hubungi 021-9929-2337 atau 0821-2406-5740 Alhijaz Indowisata adalah perusahaan swasta nasional yang bergerak di bidang tour dan travel. Nama Alhijaz terinspirasi dari istilah dua kota suci bagi umat islam pada zaman nabi Muhammad saw. yaitu Makkah dan Madinah. Dua kota yang penuh berkah sehingga diharapkan menular dalam kinerja perusahaan. Sedangkan Indowisata merupakan akronim dari kata indo yang berarti negara Indonesia dan wisata yang menjadi fokus usaha bisnis kami.

Harga Haji Umroh Bersama Mamah Dedeh di Jakarta Utara Alhijaz Indowisata didirikan oleh Bapak H. Abdullah Djakfar Muksen pada tahun 2010. Merangkak dari kecil namun pasti, alhijaz berkembang pesat dari mulai penjualan tiket maskapai penerbangan domestik dan luar negeri, tour domestik hingga mengembangkan ke layanan jasa umrah dan haji khusus. Tak hanya itu, pada tahun 2011 Alhijaz kembali membuka divisi baru yaitu provider visa umrah yang bekerja sama dengan muassasah arab saudi. Sebagai komitmen legalitas perusahaan dalam melayani pelanggan dan jamaah secara aman dan profesional, saat ini perusahaan telah mengantongi izin resmi dari pemerintah melalui kementrian pariwisata, lalu izin haji khusus dan umrah dari kementrian agama. Selain itu perusahaan juga tergabung dalam komunitas organisasi travel nasional seperti Asita, komunitas penyelenggara umrah dan haji khusus yaitu HIMPUH dan organisasi internasional yaitu IATA. Harga Haji Umroh Bersama Mamah Dedeh di Jakarta Utara

Saco-Indonesia.com - SITUASI berbahaya dalam kehidupan politik sering mengambil bentuk yang rumit dan halus.

Tidak selalu tentang kekuatan dominan yang mampu menyingkirkan oposisi. Bahaya itu bisa muncul dari keterlibatan masyarakat sipil. Kondisi Indonesia tahun 1960-an dikenal melalui film The Year of Living Dangerously. Di sana, simbol yang dihasilkan kekuatan politik dominan untuk menggalang kekuatan digunakan masyarakat sipil guna meneror masyarakat sipil lainnya. Namun, bahaya politik hampir selalu didorong apa yang terjadi di arena politik negara.

Tahun 2014 adalah the year of politicking dangerously untuk Indonesia yang juga melibatkan masyarakat sipil. Ia akan membuktikan apakah terjadi keadaan yang disebut ilmuwan politik Michael Johnston sebagai warga negara yang terpaksa tak demokra- tis. Kondisi ini lahir pada konteks negara dengan sistem politik formal demokratis, tetapi belum mampu menghadirkan mekanisme akuntabilitas para pejabat publik.  

Warga sipil yang mengambil sikap tak demokratis secara putus asa dan pragmatis memilih wakil rakyat atau pemimpin semata karena orang itu berasal dari daerahnya. Berdasarkan pertimbangan sosial mereka, wakil yang demikian setidaknya akan sedikit  memberikan perhatian atau keuntungan. Pada dasarnya sudah terjadi ketidakpercayaan yang sangat luas pada sistem politik dan para politisi seperti di Indonesia sekarang. Semua partai hampir tak dapat dipercayai. Berdasarkan pandangan seperti itu, rakyat apatis menilai calon dengan berbagai kriteria yang seharusnya secara sehat dikembangkan.

Apatisme warga

Apatisme warga negara merupakan salah satu bentukan sis- tem politik demokratis formal, tetapi tanpa akuntabilitas.  Berbeda dengan pandangan populer, demokrasi secara substansial bukan soal keterwakilan. Demokrasi yang demikian tidak menjamin perbaikan kesejahteraan yang luas. Proses perwakilan penuh problematik.

Bahkan, seandainya partai berusaha mewakili berbagai kepentingan, hal ini bergantung pada kemampuan partai/individu partai dan masyarakat tentang makna keterwakilan. Problemnya bukan menyuarakan kepentingan, melainkan menempatkan kepentingan dalam pertimbangan kepentingan yang beragam.

Bukan waktu yang menentukan kematangan demokrasi, tetapi bagaimana mekanisme membuat proses belajar tidak terdistorsi.  Kemunculan fenomena rakyat yang terpaksa menjadi tak demokratis adalah salah satu akibat dari terjadinya distorsi dalam proses demokratisasi (ke arah yang lebih tinggi).

Demokratisasi secara berbeda di setiap negara memunculkan institusi dan organisasinya sendiri, formal atau informal.  Antara institusi dan organisasi dengan yang muncul belakangan pasti ada berbagai ”jembatan”-nya. Sebagian dari jembatan itu berbahaya bagi demokratisasi.

Pertanyaan dasar bagi penulis tentang demokratisasi adalah apakah praktik yang berlangsung memperkuat atau memperlemah akuntabilitas dari setiap pemain yang menangani sumber daya publik? Jika tidak, akan terjadi penyimpangan sumber daya publik.

Penyimpangan ini dilakukan melalui hubungan dengan wilayah yang sebelumnya dianggap ilegal. Sebagai contoh, hubungan antara penegak hukum dan organisasi kemasyarakatan yang anarkistis, hubungan antara pihak yang memeriksa dan pihak yang diperiksa, hubungan antara peradilan dan broker, pejabat publik dan perusahaan abal-abal, dan sebagainya.

Melalui hubungan-hubungan ini, sumber daya publik keluar dan digunakan tidak semestinya. Lebih berbahaya lagi adalah terjadi penguatan pengorganisasian di antara pihak yang berhubungan secara ilegal atau tidak absah. Nah, apakah mekanisme demokrasi yang ada, yang dijadikan patokan, dapat mengontrol wilayah-wilayah ini.

Proses pemilu, misalnya, sama sekali tidak mampu mengontrol pembalikan wilayah ilegal ini. Hubungan antara lembaga pemerintah dan parlemen   yang  digambarkan seimbang dalam sistem demokrasi  justru memunculkan hubungan konspiratif. Para broker merupakan jembatan medium hubungan ilegal ini.

Kita boleh berdebat tentang apakah di antara calon presiden ada yang berpotensi membawa perbaikan atau tidak. Namun, persoalan dalam pemilu legislatif dapat menjadi batu besar perubahan Indonesia ke arah lebih baik. Sebagai contoh, institusi DPR periode 2009-2014 yang kinerjanya buruk sekali dan sebagian anggotanya terbukti ataupun diduga melakukan pengkhianatan publik,  sekitar 90 persen anggotanya mencalonkan diri kembali.

Jembatan ilegal

Persoalan jembatan ilegal sudah tumbuh begitu banyak dalam sistem demokrasi Indonesia. Demokratisasi adalah proses penguatan negara bersamaan dengan penguatan masyarakat. Pemimpin mendatang, jika ingin melakukan perubahan, harus dapat mengembangkan mekanisme yang menjadi pendorong keterlibatan masyarakat sipil sebagai energi melawan politisi yang ingin mengambil keuntungan diri dan kelompok. Pengetahuan teknokratik tentang hubungan kerja sama institusi negara dan masyarakat sipil sangat dibutuhkan. Penulis berpendapat ini bagian penting menilai para calon.

Akuntabilitas DPR merupakan bagian sangat penting bagi perjalanan bangsa ke depan. Meski penulis sangat skeptis dengan para calon saat ini, siapa tahu ada partai yang membuat langkah besar sebagai komitmen memperbaiki institusi DPR. Penulis, dan (yakin) juga banyak rakyat Indonesia, ingin mendengar konsep mereka lapisan demi lapisan.

Sumber : Kompas.com

Editor : Maulana Lee

2014 Ini Adalah Tahun Politik Berbahaya

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

Photo
 
Michael J. Morell Credit Mark Wilson/Getty Images

“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

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“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”

Ex-C.I.A. Official Rebuts Republican Claims on Benghazi Attack in The Great War of Our Time

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